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CAMPAIGNING IN AMERICA:
CAPTAIN JOHANN EWALD'S HESSIANS
IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Gregory D. Bereiter
Honors Research Project
Prof. Paul Bushnell
24 April 200 I
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At a time when it would seem that all historical evidence concerning the
American Revolution has been unearthed, history has surprised us yet again. In the
aftennath of World War II, a journal, unknown except to a few, which had been kept by
Captain Johann Ewald, a company commander in the Hessian Field Jager Corps, was
procured by an American historian assigned to intelligence and historical duties in the
United States Zone of Occupation in Gennany. After 30 years of piecing together the
journal's scattered volumes, translating and editing, the journal was at last published in
1979, and now stands as "the most important and comprehensive diary kept by a Hessian
I

mercenary" during the American Revolution. Indeed, the Ewald diary opens anew to
students of the Revolution a dimension of the conflict that has been somewhat discounted
by American military historians: Hessian participation as auxiliary troops hired by Great
Britain.
When the British government resolved to use force in order to subdue its
rebellious American colonies, it was all but certain that the Ministry would turn to
foreign auxiliaries, a convention which was by that time "accepted in international law as
•

2

well as practice." In the summer of 1775, the King of England, George III, had at most
I

Joseph P. Tustin, Introduction to Johann Ewald, Diary ofthe American War: A Hessian
Journal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), xix. Although both the Hessian
Corps and the British anny included within their ranks mercenaries, Le. foreigners who
had enlisted for pay, properly neither of them could be called mercenary, even though by
common usage the Hessians have been referred to as "mercenaries." Mercenaries, as
distinct from auxiliaries, are foreigners who voluntarily enroll themselves as soldiers for
a certain time, certain provisions, and a certain sum of money. Thus the Hessians with
whom we are dealing were, strictly speaking, auxiliaries (and I will refer to them as such)
and not mercenaries, as the money paid for their services went to their sovereigns.
2Auxiliary contingents served in the armies of all great powers (Russia excluded) in the
wars of the eighteenth century. International jurists of the time recognized the practice of
one prince sending aid to another at war, in the fonn of troops, in exchange for moneys
called subsidies. Britain, during the Seven Years War, paid subsidies to Frederick the
Great of Prussia to enable him to sustain his war effort against Austria and Russia, and
paid subsidies to Hessen-Kassel and other German principalities for auxiliaries to fight
against the French (Rodney Atwood, The Hessians: Mercenaries from Hessen-Kassel in
the American Revolution [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980], 1,22).

•
2

8,500 effective land troops stationed in the American colonies and 18,000 in various
garrisons of Great Britain, and it quickly became apparent that initial plans for the
subjugation of the American colonies "had been conceived on too small a scale.'? An
army of 55,000 was authorized for America, but recruiting had become "a slow
business."

4

Thus, if Britain wished to put down the rebellion by force, it could do so only

by resorting once more to the practice of hiring foreign auxiliary troops. Without the
German auxiliaries, "the attempt to subdue America would have [been]

unthinkable.'~

After overtures to hire 20,000 additional troops from Empress Catherine II of
Russia failed, England turned to the princes of Germany, several of whom were former
military allies and had for many years been supplying troops to fight under foreign flags
6

in return for financial remuneration. From the Duke of Brunswick, the Landgrave of
Hesse-Kassel, and the Prince of Waldeck, England hired at this time 17,775 men for
service in America. Of the estimated 29,867 German troops that eventually fought for
Great Britain on the American continent, nearly two-thirds came from the two Hessian
states, Hesse-Kassel and Hesse-Hanau. In the American colonies, however, all of these
German troops were collectively and indiscriminately called by one name, Hessians.

7

While the presence of the Hessians in the American Revolution has been
documented by military historians, their overall contribution to the British war effort has

3

Christopher Ward, The War ofthe Revolution (2 vols., New York: Macmillan, 1952),
208.
4
Willard M. Wallace, Appeal to Arms: A Military History ofthe American Revolution
(Chicago, 1951),99.
SPiers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1965),62.
6Hessians had shouldered arms on the North American continent for King George III in
1739, 1740, and 1742; and in Britain itself, they participated in the Battle of Culloden
against the Stuart Pretender in 1746 (Don Higgenbotham, The War ofAmerican
Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789 [New York:
Macmillan, 1971], 130).
7
Atwood, The Hessians, I; Ward, The War ofthe Revolution, 209.
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been significantly underplayed and at times overlooked altogether. Indeed, one could
even assert that their treatment has been rather perfunctory. The Hessians have been
treated as mere participants, ''warm bodies" under careless and inexperienced leadership,
a force of which was easily overrun by Washington at Trenton on Christmas night, 1776;
certainly there are "few episodes so familiar to Americans" as Washington's crossing of
8
the Delaware en route to this famous engagement. However, relatively scant attention
has been devoted to the overall contribution of the Hessian forces to the British war effort
and the significance of their role has been neither fully appreciated nor completely
understood.
The diary of Captain Johann Ewald, a company commander in the Hessian Field
Jager Corps, is an important contribution to the understanding of the nature of the War of
the Revolution, as it enables us to arrive at a more accurate estimation of the significant
Hessian contribution to the British war effort, particularly that of Captain Ewald and the
Jager Corps, the Hessian elite light infantry. Consequently, the standing military
histories of the American Revolution are in need of a revision which will restore the
importance of the Hessians as a far more significant part of the total British fighting force
that attempted to subdue the American colonies. The Ewald diary opens up the wider
issues of Hessian participation and our interpretation of the same, as we can clearly
ascertain the importance and significance of Ewald and the Jager Corps to the British
army. Moreover, the Ewald diary deepens our understanding of the nature of the military
conflict as seen through the eyes of a capable Hessian officer who fought in every major
battle from New York to Yorktown, as well as dozens of the small engagements that
characterized the war in America. Ewald's observations shed new light on key military
issues of the time, providing fresh evidence of historical issues of the American
Revolutionary period. Thus, by thoroughly examining the diary of Captain Ewald, we

8Higgenbotham, The War ofAmerican Independence, 167.
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can in essence understand more distinctly the nature of the conflict that ultimately
resulted in the "utter loss of the thirteen splendid provinces of the Crown of England.'?

The Statistics
The sheer size of the Hessian contingent that went to America in 1776 warrants
serious examination and assists in making the case that they were not a negligible factor
in the British war effort. Indeed, nearly 30,000 well trained, well-disciplined soldiers, the
total number of German troops that eventually served with Great Britain, is hardly an
inconsiderable number.
At the time the British government was negotiating the treaties that would
eventually bring the German auxiliaries into their service, the British army in America
had at most 8,500 men. General Sir William Howe knew that his 1776 campaign had to
wait on the arrival of the recently hired German troops, 8,000 of which were to be added
lo
directly to his army at New York. The Hessians were indeed "an essential part of the
11
British war plan for 1776," as a total of 12,974 entered British service that year. They
were also tough, disciplined regulars "officered by veterans trained in the school of
Frederick the Great and Ferdinand of Brunswick.',12 The Americans, on the other hand,
had no where near that many trained, disciplined, professional soldiers under arms.
Washington could boast a force near 19,000, but they were "largely untrained,
undisciplined, untried amateur soldiers" who were poorly armed, with only 9,000 being

9

Johann Ewald, Diary ofthe American War: A Hessian Journal, ed. Joseph P. Tustin
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 44.
10
R. Arthur Bowler, Logistics and the Failure ofthe British Army in America, 1775-1783
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 147.
II
Atwood, The Hessians, 52, 58.
12Mackesy, The War for America, 62. Frederick II, King of Prussia (1740-1786), who
successfully pursued a course to aggrandize Prussia militarily, and Ferdinand, Duke of
Brunswick, a subordinate and protege of the Prussian king (Lynn Montross, War Through
the Ages [New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944],375-76,384-89,391-404,405).

5

Continental regulars "possessing some small approximation of regular military skill ...
the rest [being] short-term militiamen.

13

Certainly, in sheer numbers alone the German auxiliaries were not a negligible
factor. They were indeed a formidable presence and "indispensable additions" to the
numerical strength of the British army, ultimately composing approximately one-third of
the British fighting force in America.

14

Political Implications
The hiring of the German auxiliaries in 1775 "reaped a harvest of hatred" in the
15
American colonies. To the colonists, many of whom still regarded themselves as
British subjects, the hiring of foreign troops to settle a domestic quarrel with the colonies
"was a clear sign that the Ministry was relying on coercion, leaving no option but
resistance.',16 By contemporary European standards, it was "normal practice" to hire
auxiliary troops to fight against foreign enemies, "but the hiring of them by Britain
seemed irrefutable proof to the colonists that they were to be treated as foreigners.,,17
When the intercolonial Congress at Philadelphia heard the news of the German treaties,
18

they immediately took further actions ''to shore up the American cause."

Congress

established the Committee of Secret Correspondence to conduct diplomacy with foreign
nations and created a Continental navy.19 Moreover, many members of Congress called
13

Higgenbotham, The War 0/American Independence, 209; Weigley, The American Way
0/War, 4.
14
Alden, The American Revolution, 67
15
John Richard Alden, The American Revolution, 1775-1783 (New York: Harper & Row,
1954),67.
16
Atwood, The Hessians, 31.
17
Alden, The American Revolution, 67.
18
Henry M. Ward, The American Revolution: Nationhood Achieved, 1763-1788 (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1995),67.
19
Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic History o/the American Revolution (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1985), 50-51.

-
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for the establishment of state governments and a confederation of states, which were to
be the first steps toward autonomy.
Thus, the news of the German treaties greatly increased colonial animosity toward
the British government, solidified military resistance to the Crown as had few other
0

factors, and "gave added impetus to the fateful Declaration of Independence.,1

What Historians Have Said
It seems odd then that the Hessian contribution to the British war effort during the

American Revolution has been somewhat overlooked and even discounted by prominent
Revolutionary historians. The more notable literature concerning the military struggle
either omits evaluation of the Hessian contribution or treats it in a rather perfunctory
manner. The Hessians were there, historians admit; they were a part of the British forces,
historians concede. A garrison of Hessians was defeated by Washington at Trenton. Fort
Washington was renamed Ft. Knyphausen after it fell to Hessian forces commanded by
Lieutenant General Knyphausen of the Hessian Corps. However, American military
historians have not taken discussion of the Hessians much beyond the aforementioned,
nor made any attempt to adequately evaluate their contribution to the British war effort.
Prominent Revolutionary historian John Shy, formerly of the University of
Michigan, in his A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for
Independence (1976) made mention of the Hessians only six times. He stated nothing
beyond the facts that England hired "German mercenaries," that the Hessians served with
the British army, and that a contingent of them was defeated at the battle of Bennington,
1777.

21

In fact, most of the older authorities on the military history of the Revolution had

even less to say regarding Hessian participation. Howard H. Peckham, in his The War for
20

Alden, The American Revolution, 67.
John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for
American Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976),97, 151, 177.
21

•
7

Independence: A Military History (1958), mentioned only the "hiring" of the Hessian
forces, their presence in Howe's expedition to New York in 1776, the defeat at Trenton,
and "as for the German mercenaries [at the end of the war], only 17,300 of the 30,000
employed went home; 7,500 had died, and 5,000 had deserted to remain in a country and
a society which they saw were so superior to their own.,,22 In like manner, Willard M
Wallace's Appeal to Arms: A Military History ofthe American Revolution briefly
discussed the negotiations between Britain and the German princes, the presence of
Hessians in the battle of Long Island, the defeat at Trenton, and their continued presence
23
within the British army for the duration of the war. Again, there was no appraisal or
judgment whatsoever concerning the nature of the Hessian contribution to the British war
effort.
While Christopher Ward's The War ofthe Revolution (2 vols., 1952), mentioned
Hessian participation a great deal more than Shy, Peckham, and Wallace, there still was
no serious assessment or evaluation of Hessian contribution beyond the facts that Great
Britain hired a substantial number of these auxiliaries, that 8,000 Hessians were part of
the British camp on Staten Island in 1776, that they were present in the campaign that
year (a garrison of them being defeated at Trenton that Christmas), and that they were a
continual presence throughout the duration of the war, in the battles of Long Island, Fort
Washington, Brandywine, White Plains, Newport, and Charleston. Ward's lengthy
discussion of Brandywine makes no mention of the fact that it was none other than
Captain Ewald, as we learn from his diary, who led the Howe/Cornwallis column around
Washington's left flank. Additionally, nowhere in Ward's two volumes are the Hessians
mentioned as playing a significant or even decisive role in the combat.

22

Howard H. Peckham, The War for Independence: A Military History (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1958), 38, 170, 194.
23
Wallace, Appeal to Arms, 99-111 passim, 126-7, 251.

8

The only Revolutionary historian to make any evaluation whatsoever concerning
Hessian participation is Don Higgenbotham, formerly of the University of North
Carolina, in his The War ofAmerican Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and

Practice, 1763-1789 (1971). Yet while Higgenbotham reluctantly concedes that some of
the German regiments, particularly the Jager Corps, "compared favorably with the best in
the British army" and ''were effective in beating back American harassing parties," this is
neither a serious attempt to assess their importance to the British army nor a thorough
24
evaluation of their overall contribution to the British war effort.
Indeed, from a thorough study of the existing military histories of the American
Revolution, it would seem that the Hessian forces contributed virtually nothing of
significance to the British war effort in America. We can clearly see that the Hessian
forces were present, but we do not observe any awareness of a significant role played by
them or any importance of the Hessians to the British army in America. These historians
will concede that the Hessians added numerical strength to the British forces, but they
have not undertaken any serious evaluation of Hessian contribution or significance in the
war for America.
Hence, are we to conclude that Hessian participation was insignificant? The diary
of Captain Johann Ewald replies resoundingly to the negative. By adding the diary of
Captain Ewald to the existing literature of the American Revolution, we can remedy this
serious case of oversight on the part of Revolutionary historians. In examining Ewald's
diary, students of the Revolution can understand the considerable importance of the
Hessian Jager Corps to the British army in America.

24Higgenbotham, The War ofAmerican Independence, 132.
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Captain Johann Ewald and the Field Jager Corps in America
The Jagers were the elite of the Hessian Corps, often called "chasseurs" by the
British and Americans?5 They were a small unit of elite light infantry troops who drew
their rank and file from among huntsmen, foresters, gameskeepers, and others who were
experts at shooting. In the American war, the Hessian Jagers served both mounted and
on foot, and were equipped with rifled weapons. Unlike the British light infantry, the
Jagers were not equipped with bayonets, and thus faced the danger of being spitted in a
bayonet charge. Consequently, if the Jagers were not working directly with light
infantry, they were combined with bodies of Hessian grenadiers doing service as light
troops. Additionally, unlike soldiers offield and garrison regiments, the Jagers "had to
be men of sufficient reliance and intelligence" to work in smaller units engaged in
26
scouting and patrolling, as they so often did in America. More importantly though, the
Jagers were volunteers and professionals. And although the Jagers numbered slightly
over 1,000 troops, the Ewald diary reveals that they performed duties that were quite
disproportionate to their small numbers.
There were two Jager companies sent to America in 1776, the 2nd Jager Company
being commanded by Captain Johann Ewald. From the outset of his diary, which began
with the departure of the troops from Hesse, we can clearly see the importance of Ewald
and the Jager Corps to the army of General William Howe. Shortly after arriving off
Sandy Hook on 22 October 1776, Captain Ewald received orders to "march at once to
headquarters," where he was "delighted with the message, for ... I wished for nothing
more than to get to know the enemy.,,27 The bulk of the British army was to take Long
Island that day, and the Jagers and light infantry were to occupy the village of Flatbush.
25The word chasseur usually referred to a French soldier in a special unit equipped and
trained for rapid deployment. The word was taken from the French, meaning literally
"hunter."
26
Atwood, The Hessians, 132-3.
27
Ewald, Diary ofthe American War, 8 (23 October 1776).
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During the battle, however, there was a miscommunication between Ewald and Captain
Wreden, commander of the 1st Jager Company. Ewald mistakenly advanced his
company upon several battalions of American riflemen in Major General Charles Lee's
division, whereupon Colonel von Donop had to come to his aid with a battalion of
English light infantry with two field pieces, "whose bayonets and grapeshot provided the
precious air by which [Ewald] was saved.,,28
After the engagement, Ewald received a "sharp reprimand" from the
Commanding General of the Hessian forces, General von Heister, who was presumably
upset that his elite unit could have erred in such a way. Ewald went on to record,
however, that General Howe, ''who apparently noticed that the Hessian general must have
said something unpleasant to me, expressed his satisfaction to me through one of his
adjutants," a compliment repeated in the order of the army the following day, which also
said: "It is to be regretted that so many brave jagers have been sacrificed through a
misunderstanding.,,29 Thus, even after Ewald's first engagement on the American
continent, the Commanding General of the British Anny had expressed satisfaction with
his conduct.
When the British army marched on 23 October to prepare for the attack upon Ft.
Washington30, Ewald recorded that "it was decided [from this day on] that the Donop
Jager Company should constantly cover the right wing [of the army] and I with my

28 Ibid ., 10.
29Ibid., 10. Ewald met Colonel Edward Hand's riflemen of Major General Charles Lee's
division. The losses reported differ slightly (Revolution in America; Confidential Letters
and Journals 1776-1784 ofAdjutant General Major Baurmeister ofthe Hessian Forces.
Bernhard A. Uhlendorf, ed. and trans. [New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,
1957], 62; Edward J. Lowell, The Hessians and the other German Auxiliaries ofGreat
Britain in the Revolutionary War [Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1965], 199).
30Fort Washington was situated on the highest eminence on Manhattan Island, above the
ste~ and rocky slopes overlooking the Hudson River; the site between present 181 st and
186 streets in New York City (Douglas S. Freeman, George Washington: A Biography,
7 vols. [New York, 1948-57], IV, 243-48).

•
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company the left wing. Moreover, when the army marched in wing formation, or in two
columns, a jager company was to serve as the advance guard," a duty which they
performed for the duration of the war.

31

Certainly, the Jagers were a capable force if they

had been entrusted with the safety of General Howe's army when on the march.
Indeed, throughout the rest of the 1776 campaign and into 1777, Ewald and the
Jagers were constantly engaged with distinction. In the attack upon White Plains, 27
October 1776, the left column ofthe British force had encountered an advanced corps of
Americans, "which [Ewald] had to engage supported by the light infantry.,,32 When the
33
larger Hessian contingent had captured Chatterton Hill and the Americans had given
way, Howe disrupted Washington's efforts to set up and fortify his encampment "by the
fire of the jagers and light infantry.,,34
In preparation for the British attack upon Fort Washington one week later, Ewald
35
was "cordially asked by Colonel Donop" to conduct the initial reconnaissance. After
the fort had fallen to British and Hessian forces and was renamed Fort Knyphausen,
36
General Washington crossed the Hudson River and occupied Fort Lee. Shortly
thereafter, the Hessian Jagers, grenadiers, and five English brigades under Lord
Cornwallis invaded New Jersey. While on the march, Ewald fell upon and engaged a
force of Americans, and "quickly sent back a jager to fetch more men, but instead of the
jagers, I received an order from Lord Cornwallis to return at once." When Ewald
31

Ibid., 10 (25 October 1776).
32Ibid., 12 (26 October 1776). The American force Ewald encountered consisted of five
to six hundred men, mixed militia and Continentals, sent out to delay the British advance
(Freeman, George Washington, IV, 229).
33A commanding eminence defended by Major General Alexander Dougall's brigade,
aided by troops from Delaware, Maryland, and Massachusetts, with two guns under
Captain Alexander Hamilton (Freeman, George Washington, IV, 228-31).
34
Ewald, Diary ofthe American War, 13 (26 October 1776).
35 .
IbId., 15 (14 November 1776).
36Of four main assault forces, General Knyphausen at his own request had led the most
important (Atwood, The Hessians, 77).
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returned and informed Cornwallis of what he had discovered, the general replied "Let
them go, my dear Ewald, and stay here. We do not want to lose any men. One jager is
worth more than ten rebels.,,37 Indeed, this remark by Cornwallis reveals the high esteem
in which the Jagers were held and their value to the British army.
Likewise, further gestures by Cornwallis reveal the value of the Hessian Jagers to
the British army. On 9 January 1777 Cornwallis visited Ewald's advanced post, and
when he found the Jagers "very cheerful despite their ragged clothing and hard duty, he
ordered [Ewald] to assure [them] ... that eachjager would be clothed at [Cornwallis's]
expense."

38

Two weeks later, the promised clothing arrived from Cornwallis, ''which
39

consisted of a complete uniform for each man."

Several days later and after another

engagement in which Ewald's Jagers fought bravely, Cornwallis "honored me by
publishing an order expressing his satisfaction with me and my courageous men, and
40

each jager received a gift of one piaster."

On 12 February Ewald received orders to report to headquarters, ''where Lord
Cornwallis showed his confidence in me by entrusting me with drawing up a plan for a
surprise attack on Bound Brook," an attack which due to the weather was postponed until
spring.

41

This gesture by Cornwallis again evidenced Ewald's great value to the army,

and more, evidenced his capability as a soldier as a British general was entrusting a
company commander with the task of devising battle plans. Additionally, the attack was
a success when carried out two months later. On 12 April, Ewald and a detachment of
thirty Jagers drove the numerically superior force of Americans at Bound Brook into a

37

Ewald, Diary ofthe American War, 18 (19 November 1776).
.
IbId., 52 (9 January 1777).

38

39

Ibid., 52 (23 January 1777).
4o Ibid., 55 (8 February 1777).

4l Ibid .

(12 February 1777).
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field fort, which was finally taken from the rear by a larger body of troops under General
James Grant.

42

During Howe's campaign of 1777, the Hessian Jagers were included among the
43
expeditionary force while many of the other Hessian units were left behind. Ewald's
Jager company distinguished itself on numerous occasions during this campaign.
Additionally, the Jagers under the command of Ewald and Captain Wreden formed the
advanced guard and marched at the head of the British army at all times. On the march
toward Iron Hill, Maryland on 3 September 1777 Ewald was again given the advanced
guard, "whereupon the Commanding General [Howe] recommended the greatest
caution." After the charge was sounded, "the enemy was attacked so severely and with
such spirit by the jagers that we became masters of the mountain after a seven hour
engagement.'.44 The Jager companies played such a leading part in the rout of the
American troops that Ewald and the other officers of the Jager Corps "received the
following expression ofthanks from the Commander in Chief' on orders:
The courageous manner in which ... the entire personnel of the Jager
Corps, defeated yesterday the picked troops of the enemy ... deserves the

42

.

•

IbId., 56 (12 ApnI1777).
43General Howe's 1777 campaign, also called the Saratoga Campaign, involved a series
of engagements fought (June-Oct. 1777) in New York. To split the colonies along the
Hudson, the British planned a three-pronged advance on Albany from Canada, N from
New York City, E along the Mohawk River. The northern force never arrived. The
eastern force, under Barry St. Leger, besieged Fort Stanwix (Aug. 3) but, frightened by a
rumor (Aug. 22), retreated to Canada. Coming south, John Burgoyne captured
Ticonderoga (July 6), but was later defeated in a raid on Bennington (Aug. 14-16).
Burgoyne halted near Saratoga Springs, where American forces, under Horatio Gates,
prevented him from breaking through at Freeman's Farm (Sept. 19) and Bemis Heights
(Oct. 7). Outnumbered and surrounded, Burgoyne surrendered (Oct. 17). This was the
first great American victory of the Revolution.
The embarkation returns of the expedition show Howe's reduced dependence on
the auxiliaries as a whole, as only 4,441 Hessians were taken (Atwood, The Hessians,
117). However, the fact that the entire Jager Corps was taken is a further testament of
their indispensability to Howe.
44Ewald, Diary ofthe American War, 78 (3 September 1777).
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highest praise and the fullest acknowledgment of the Commander in
Chief, and has attracted the greatest admiration of the entire army.45
Likewise, in the attack upon Brandywine one week later, Ewald and the Jagers were
again at the forefront of the attack. Ewald recorded that it was he personally who led the
Cornwallis colwnn around Washington's right wing.

46

After the battle of Brandywine47 ,

both Ewald and Wreden were decorated with the Hessian Knight Order pour la vertu

militaire, an award given for their distinguished conduct. Indeed, this was a great honor
for the two men, "as they were the first officers of the rank of captain to be thus
distinguished.,,48 In fact, Ewald left so favorable an impression upon Lord Cornwallis
that when the latter left the army to return to England in December 1777, Ewald received
from him the following letter:
Sir.
I cannot leave this country without desiring you to accept my best thanks
for your good services during the two Campaigns in which I have had the
honour to command the Hessian Chasseurs. If the war should continue, I
hope we shall again serve together. Ifwe should be separated, I shall ever
49
remember the distinguished merit and Ability's [sic] of Captain Ewald.
In addition, General Howe, upon being relieved by General Clinton in May 1778, wrote a
comparable letter to both Ewald and Wreden on his departure:

Gentlemen:
Please allow me to bear witness, before my departure, to the extreme
satisfaction I have always had in your distinguished conduct in the two
campaigns during which I have had the honor to command you. The
conduct of the two premier companies of Hessian chasseurs, incited by the
45

Ibid., 78 (4 September 1777).
Ibid., 83 (11 September 1777); Atwood, The Hessians, 134-35.
47The battle of Brandywine was fought 11 September 1777, along the Brandywine Creek
in southeastern Pennsylvania, between Sir William Howe and General Washington.
Howe's strategy of attacking the American right flank forced Washington to retreat, and
the advancing British took Philadelphia.
48
Lowell, The Hessians, 199.
49
Ewald, Diary ofthe American War, 110 (16 December 1777).
46
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zeal and brave example of their chiefs - you gentlemen - has been noticed
50
by the entire anny, and made such an unforgettable impression on me....
When the British withdrew from Philadelphia on 19 December 1778, Ewald and
the Jagers frustrated an American attempt to break down several bridges and delay the
march of Clinton's anny. After finding two beams still remaining on one of the bridges,
Ewald immediately crossed over with the advanced guard of eighty Jagers "to take post
on the other side ... by which the workmen were protected.'.51 He then discovered
another bridge "on which people were working to destroy it" and quickly "let fly in
earnest" a concentrated volume of fire on the enemy, whereupon "they abandoned the
bridge and ran away into the nearest wood."

52

After the bridges had been repaired,

allowing the British to withdraw, Ewald "received from the Commander in Chiefhis
thanks and the compliment that I had saved the anny a longer march by my diligence.',53
In December 1779, while the British anny prepared for its expedition to the south,
Ewald reported to headquarters to find out the details of the approaching embarkation.
Upon meeting General Knyphausen, then the Commanding General of the Hessian
forces, Ewald heard the following words: "General Clinton and Lord Cornwallis request
you for the approaching expedition," at which point Ewald "jumped for joy, hurried to
the Corps with my orders, and readied myself for the march."

54

Again, for the

Commander in Chief of the British forces to personally request the services of Captain
Ewald in the approaching expedition tells us a great deal about the excellent capability of
this officer and his troops.
Ewald's Jager company and that of Captain Johann Hinrichs further distinguished
themselves at the siege of Charleston in 1780. Ewald took it upon himself to have the

50
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IbId., 131 (19 May 1778).
5I Ibid., 133 (19 June 1778).
52 bOd
I I
53 bOd
I I
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Ibid., 189·90 (14 December 1779).
0
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Jagers fire rifle shots "at a communication consisting ofpalisades."s5 After he "observed
with astonishment the effect of the rifle shots... [he] decided to shoot at the embrasures.
At sunset the Commander in Chief came into the trenches and took the firing in very
good part, since the men had asserted the fire of the besieged on this side had become
weaker ....,,56 At times, the Jagers "kept entire sections of [American] guns so warm
that often not a shot was fired by the enemy for hours. ,,57 After Charleston fell to the
British, "the besieged tried to conceal their losses, but one officer told [Ewald] that the
largest number had been killed by rifle bullets.,,58
In Benedict Arnold's raiding expedition to Portsmouth, Virginia, Ewald and the
Jagers were given the task of defending an important causeway. When the Americans
advanced and the situation grew a bit precarious, General Arnold panicked and asked
Ewald if the enemy would possibly take the post. Ewald wrote: "The question annoyed
me, for he could see it all for himself. - I said, 'No! As long as one jager lives, no damned
59

American will come across the causeway!'"

Ewald and the Jagers defended Arnold's

small post for four hours against a superior enemy force. Eventually the Americans gave
up the action and hastily withdrew. Ewald "rejoiced over the magnificent behavior of my
brave jagers, who with all eclat had thus distinguished themselves before the eyes ofthe
English. For surely one jager had fought against thirty Americans today." Once again,
he earned a British general's acknowledgment of the "excellent conduct" of his Jagers on
60
orders.
Captain Ewald received commendation not only from British generals but also
from the Commanding General of the Hessian forces, General Wilhelm Freiherr
55Ibid., 229 (13 April 1780).
56lbid. An embrasure is a slanted opening in the wall or parapet of a fortification,
designed so that a defender can fire through it on attackers.
s7lbid.
58Ibid ., 238 (11 May 1780).
59

.

Ibid., 291 (18 March 1781).
60lbid .
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Knyphausen. On 21 March 1781 Ewald received a letter from General Knyphausen
which stated:
I cannot fail to take pleasure in mentioning the special trust which I have
always placed in your well-known ability and braveryt which has been
justified by the lauding example that you gave of it in your conduct of the
affair on the 19th of March. Such an example by you and your
detachment resounds to the greatest honor and has received the complete
satisfaction of the Commanding General and the Army.61
In the final Virginia campaignt Ewald served with Colonel John Graves Simcoet
62
commander ofthe Queents Rangers. The two became good friends and their corps
worked together splendidlYt in fact so splendidly that the following commendation was
issued on 27 June 1781:
Lord Cornwallis desires that Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe will accept [the]
warmest Acknowledgment for his judicious and spirited Conduct ... [and]
likewise desires that Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe will communicate his
best thanks to Captain Ewaldt to the Detachment of the Yagers [sic] and to
•
63
the Officers and SoldIers of the Queens Rangers.

Simcoet writing to Knyphausen to commend Ewaldts servicet called him "that most
excellent officer.

tt64

In fact t Ewald recorded how "this worthy mantt had in July 1781

said that "he wished that I would accept the majorts berth in the Ranger Corps .... But I
am Hessian t body and soul t and it seems to me that I could not be happy outside this
splendid corps in which I serve.

tt65

61
Ibid., 299 (21 May 1781).
62
The Queents Rangers were a Loyalist cavalry unit originally raised by Colonel Robert
Rogers in 1776 (Mark V. Kwasny, Washington's Partisan War, 1775-1783 [Kentt Ohio:
Kent State University Press t 1996], 149).
63
Ewaldt Diary ofthe American War, 312.
64Quoted in Atwood, The Hessians, 135-6.
65
Ewald t Diary ofthe American War, 316.
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Ewald and Simcoe were both trapped with Cornwallis at Yorktown, and Ewald's
company was down to a sixth of its original strength when Cornwallis surrendered on 17
October 1781, thereby bringing victory to the rebellious American colonies. Shortly after
the siege ended, however, Ewald "had the pleasure and honor of being invited to dine
with the general officers," including Washington, Comte de Rochambeau, the Marquis de
Lafayette.

66

Also, as a prisoner of war on Long Island, Ewald received a letter with an

enclosure from General Knyphausen, containing an extract of a letter from "his Serene
Highness," the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel himself, which read:

Among the reports reaching me is that of the ... fine conduct of Captain
Ewald of the Jager Corps, which is altogether pleasing to learn.
The Lieutenant General,67 therefore, desires to declare to ... Captain
Ewald, my extraordinary satisfaction and the assurance of my entirely
.

speCial favor and grace.

68

Indeed, as evidenced by Ewald's accounts of his exploits over the duration of the
war, we can clearly observe the indispensability of Captain Ewald and the Jager Corps to
the British army in America. The Jagers were employed to great advantage and their
conduct did not go unnoticed, evidenced by the numerous commendations they were
given and the many favorable letters which Captain Ewald received from the British
generals. Furthermore, of twenty-five Hessian officers decorated with the order pour la

vertu militaire in the war, five belonged to the Jager Corps: Ewald, Wreden, Captain
Philip von Wurmb, Lieutenant Colonel Carl von Prueschenk, and Colonel Ludwig von

66 '
IbI d.,342.
67Lieutenant General Baron Friedrich von Jungkenn, minister of state, and minister of
war (Carl Leopold Baurmeister, Revolution in America; Confidential Letters and
Journals 1776-1784 ofAdjutant General Major Baurmeister ofthe Hessian Forces.
Bernhard A. Uhlendorf, ed. and trans. [New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,
1957], x).
68
Ewald, Diary ofthe American War, 345.
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Wurmb.

69

Thus by examining Ewald's diary we can clearly see the need to revise the

standing military histories of the Revolution to include the contribution of Ewald and the
Jagers, as they were certainly a force of great importance to the army of Great Britain.

Captain Ewald and the American Experience
The diary of Captain Ewald reveals not only the importance of the Hessian Jager
Corps to the British army, but also gives students of the American Revolution a first-hand
look at the partisan and irregular nature of the war.
In the American War, the Jagers participated in a military struggle that was very
different from those they had seen in Western Europe, where war, including irregular
war, was waged by professional soldiers, members of the regular forces. In America, the
situation was much different. Here they experienced light infantry war not only against
Continental regulars (permanent members of the field army) but also against the part-time
citizen soldiery of the militia, "armed farmers" as Ewald described them, an "irregular"
7o

war by regulars against true irregulars.

Although the colonists lacked a standing army

and were thus militarily the weaker side, they raised the concept of irregular warfare to
new level.

a

71

Ewald was certainly not one to disparage the effectiveness of the colonial militia
in this partisan war, however. After receiving heavy casualties on several foraging
expeditions in New Jersey in early 1777, the British commanders were forced to send out
increasingly larger foraging parties. Ewald recognized the capability of the New Jersey
militia by recording that "[s]ince the army would have been gradually destroyed through
72

this foraging, from here on the forage was procured from New York."
69

In fact, after the

Atwood, The Hessians, 134.
Ewald, Diary ofthe American War, 338.
7 1Robert A. Selig and David C. Skaggs, Introductory Essay to Johann Ewald, Treatise on
Partisan Warfare, 24.
70

72

Ewald, Diary ofthe American War, 55.
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war was over, Ewald remembered the determination of the militia in his own Treatise on

Partisan Warfare (1785):
Never have I seen [evasive] maneuvres [sic] performed better than by the
American militia, and especially that of the Province of New Jersey. If
you were forced to retreat against these people you could certainly count
.
71
on constantly haVIng them around you.
We again witness the capability of the colonial militia as Ewald recounted the British
army crossing from Philadelphia into New Jersey in June 1778. Ewald noted on 17 June
that "the militia received us with sharp rifle fire" and ''the skirmishing continued without
letup."

74

Likewise, on 2 December 1778 Ewald recorded Brigadier General Sir William

Erskine's advance upon Tarrytown, New York, noting that Erskine's force had dislodged
the colonial militia only after "a stubborn fight:,75 Ewald further recorded on 29 October
1779 that his ''very good friend Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe" of the Queen's Rangers had
been "badly wounded in the Province of Jersey.,,76 Simcoe had taken a party of over two
hundred to destroy several American weapons reserves in New Jersey and had succeeded
in laying waste to one such magazine. "But as soon as the state militia learned of it,"
Ewald noted, they "shot down the majority of his men, and finally wounded and captured
him."

77

Ewald certainly acknowledged the capability of these "armed farmers"

throughout his diary.

73Johann Ewald, Treatise on Partisan Warfare, trans. and ed. Robert A. Selig and David
C. Skaggs (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 115. This edition is translated from the
German Abhand/ung uber den K/einen Krieg (Cassel: Johann Jacob Cramer, 1785).
74

Ewald, Diary ofthe American War, 132.
75 Ib'd
1 ., 157.
76
Ibid., 179.
77Ibid., 182. Simcoe was ambushed and captured near New Brunswick on 27 October
1779. He returned to active duty 31 December 1779 (Kwasny, Washington's Partisan
War, 251).
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The diary of Captain Ewald further illuminates the partisan nature of the war in
America.

78

The War of American Independence was at once revolutionary and partisan

in the very scope of the colonists' objective: to eliminate British power completely from
the vast extent of the thirteen colonies.79 The war was also one of national liberation,
which contributed to the partisan nature that Ewald recognized.
For the lagers it was often a war of outposts, and of small detachments engaging
80

regular troops as well as the "armed country people who are all excellent shots."
Furthermore, we can see that the nature of the military conflict in America was

something quite new to the lagers, as Ewald recorded how several of his officers "were
81

young and inexperienced in this kind of warfare."

Nevertheless they adapted, and

adapted well.
As we can understand from Ewald's diary, the lagers were employed as partisan
troops for the majority of their time in America, even while they were still part of the
overall war effort carried out by the regular British forces. Ewald's lagers specialized in
partisan operations in America, primarily in the ambuscade, or ambush. They frequently
operated as detachments and small parties sent out "to annoy the enemy," and were
employed to remarkable advantage in reconnaissance missions, patrol duties, and in
protecting foraging parties.

82

78

The Oxford English Dictionary defines a partisan as a ''member of a party of light or
irregular troops employed in scouring the country, surprising the enemy's outposts and
foraging parties, and the like; a member of a volunteer force similarly engaged, a
guerrilla." A partisan is a "leader of such a party of light or irregular troops" (Oxford
English Dictionary, 20 vols. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989], s.v. "Partisan").
79Weigley, The American Way of War, 19.
80
Ewald, Diary ofthe American War, 182; posts, 10-11,51-52,92,96, 105.
81
.
IbId., 22.
82 .
IbId., 14; detachments and patrols, 11, 15,31,34,39,42,51,62,68, 75, 76, 90-1, 93,

104, 122-3, 126, 130, 133, 140-1, 143, 150, 178, 195-220,221-43,261,267-8,274,303
5,312-3,328,349,389.
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Ewald recognized this partisan war as such, and wrote of attempting to develop
"my own theory of partisan warfare.,,83 He was not slow in recognizing, additionally, the
extremely harsh and dangerous nature of the duty performed by the lagers in America.
From Ewald's many accounts, one can "perceive how dangerous is the service of light
troops in this country.,,84 While the regular British army could enjoy a brief respite
between engagements, Ewald noted that the partisan war ''was carried on constantly in
full force. Not a day passed in which the lager Corps, the light infantry, and the Queen's
Rangers were not alarmed, and several people of the parties killed, wounded, or
captured.,,85 Hence, Ewald recognized exceptional confidence ''which a partisan needs
for this ticklish trade.,,86
And since in America the enemy could be anywhere, the lagers had to be able to
confront him anywhere. Thus, the only way to find the increasingly evasive enemy was
to search him out, to deprive him of his cover in the populace. Hence, Ewald recorded
several instances where he resorted to bribing the locals, which usually resulted in their
cooperation as guides or informants. Shortly before the battle of White Plains in October
1776, Ewald recorded that a loyalist came to him and revealed the location of an enemy
provisions depot, but only ''would guide me to it if! would give him reward.,,87 Hence
Ewald gave the man "a small recompense" and went off to headquarters with the

83 .
IbId., 10.
84
Ibid., 182.
85 '
IbI d ., 104.
86Ibid ., 23.
87 Ibid ., 11 (26 October 1776).
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infonnation.

88

During the Virginia Campaign, Ewald frequently recorded using Negroes

as guides and infonnants. Ewald also noted obtaining "a faithful Negro ... who for two
89

guineas undertook to carry a letter from me to Lord Cornwallis."

On one occasion,

Ewald did not even have to pay for infonnation, ''when a loyal Negro infonned [him] that
one thousand Americans were lying in ambuscade" not far from where Ewald was
patrolling. On another morning, Ewald recorded that "a Negro came running to me at top
speed, who assured me that if I would give him two gold guineas he would reveal
something valuable to me.,,90 Captain Ewald "quickly opened [his] purse and handed
him the money," whereupon his black friend infonned him of recent American troop
•

movements m the area.

91

Clearly, this was a war with dimensions unlike any the lagers had ever
encountered in Europe.

Ewald as a Diarist
The diary of Captain Ewald is an significant contribution to the literature of the
American Revolution not only because it reveals the usefulness of the Hessian lagers to
the British Anny, but also because it sheds new light on several of the key historical
issues of the struggle which eventually brought political independence to the American
colonies. Moreover, a dimension is revealed here that is of rare perspective, as Ewald, by
virtue of his position, witnessed and took part in considerably more action than the

88

Ibid.
•
IbId., 302 (29 May 1781).
90 Ibid ., 323 (18 August 1781).
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average officer. Moreover, he was an astute observer and shows considerable
shrewdness in his remarks. As a result, Ewald's diary indeed helps us to better
understand the nature of the military contest that was the American Revolution.
Ewald was in a very favorable position to comment, which adds considerable
significance to his observations, not only because he was an officer in constant contact
with those in the upper echelons of the British command structure, but more importantly
because he was a company commander who actually led his troops in field operations and
fought beside them. Hence, the view of the war that we get from the diary of Captain
Ewald is of intrinsically more value to students of the Revolution than the letters and
journals of Adjutant General Major Carl Baurmeister and those of Major General
Friedrich Riedesel and Baroness von Riedesel, which are the standard accounts
concerning Hessian participation in the Revolutionary War and have been regarded as
valuable source materials for quite some time.
Major Baurmeister's journals, partly because of his position as an Adjutant
General, the chief administrative officer of a major military unit, provides us with a view
of the war that is somewhat removed from day-to-day action in the field, as Baurmeister
was most likely at staff headquarters while Captain Ewald was leading his jagers on field
maneuvers. Moreover, as Baurmeister's writings were regularly sent back to Lieutenant
General Baron Friedrich von Jungkenn, minister of state and minister of war in Hesse,
they lack the candor and veracity found within the diary of Captain Ewald, which was
written only for him.
Likewise, the correspondence and journals of Baron and Baroness von Riedesel
have also been regarded as valuable source materials for nearly a century. However,
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these accounts are also very different from Ewald's account for two reasons.
Fundamentally, Baron von Riedesel's rank of Major General ensured that he was
removed from the kind of action seen by Captain Ewald. Secondly, the Convention
Army, which consisted of the force of British General John Burgoyne, of which
Riedesel's Brunswickers were a part, surrendered to General Horatio Gates at Saratoga in
1777. Hence, Riedesel actually participated in military engagements for only a fraction
of the time of Ewald's service in America.
The fact that Captain Ewald published his Treatise on Partisan Warfare almost
immediately after his return from the American War is not only proof of his
professionalism but also gives him greater credence as a diarist as well. Ewald's Treatise
itself was an important contribution to the literature of eighteenth-century light infantry
tactics. The work was even honored with the approval of Frederick the Great of Prussia.
The difference with other light infantry manuals of the time, though, lies in the fact that
Ewald's examples and analyses were to a large degree based on his experiences in the
.
92
Amencan War.
Moreover, Ewald had a very distinguished career after the American War. In
December 1785 Ewald was ordered by the new Landgrave in Hesse-Hanau to organize
the Hanau Jager Corps. After he had received his discharge from the Hessian army in
February 1788, Ewald entered active service in Denmark, which at that time was at war
with Sweden. Soon after his arrival, Ewald organized the Schleswig Jager Corps, which
he levied and commanded with the rank of lieutenant colonel. In 1790 Ewald was
elevated to Danish nobility, promoted to colonel in 1795, and to major general in 1802.
He also founded a corps library and wrote and published three more military treatises.

920fthe fifty-four examples in Ewald's Treatise, thirty-six are taken from the American
War, sixteen from the Seven Years' War, and two from other wars. All four examples in
Ewald's appendix are taken from the American Revolution as well (Johann Ewald,
Treatise on Partisan Warfare, trans. and ed. Robert Selig and David Skaggs [New York:
Greenwood Press, 1991], 50).
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Ewald also fought valiantly during the Napoleonic wars, which resulted in his promotion
to lieutenant general in 1809 and commanding general of the Duchy of Holstein in 1812.
He retired from active duty on 1 May 1813, after fifty-three years of military service?3
Thus, Ewald's diary is of particular value not only because it helps students of the
Revolution understand the significant contribution of the Hessian Jager Corps to the
British war effort. The diary also aids in our understanding of the nature of the military
struggle both through Ewald's accounts of specific engagements and also his
observations concerning the British conduct of the war, the Continental Army, the
American militia, and other insights that he provides.

British Conduct ofthe War

The diary of Captain Ewald is particularly significant for his critical opinions of
British generals and their conduct of the war, and for his divulgence of substantial
evidence relating to military activities and occurrences that continue to perplex historians
of the Revolutionary period.
Ewald raised the serious accusation of British foot-dragging through New Jersey
in late 1776. While the British and Hessian forces under Cornwallis were en route to the
attack upon Fort Lee, Ewald's company had been protecting the right flank and had
proceeded "further to the right in hopes of catching some [American] baggage,"
whereupon he received new orders to keep closer to the column.

94

"I now perceived what

was afoot," Ewald recorded, as "[w]e wanted to spare the King's subjects and hoped to
terminate the war amicably, in which assumption I was strengthened ... by several
95

English officers."

93Tustin, Introduction to Ewald, Diary ofthe American War, xxvii-xxxi.
94
Ewald, Diary ofthe American War, 18.
95 b.
lId.
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After Comwallis had captured Fort Lee with over 100 prisoners, and was
reinforced with nine more battalions, Ewald recorded that Washington's vanishing army
was permitted to retreat across Jersey, an observation previously unknown. This
deliberate delay on the part of Comwallis enraged the citizens of Pennsylvania, including
outspoken loyalist Joseph Galloway,96 who arrived in the British camp and "implored the
general to press General Washington as closely as possible" in order to "surely destroy
97

and capture his disheartened army."

When Comwallis did not do so, Ewald recorded

Galloway as shouting, "'I see, they don't want to finish the war!', which every honest
man must think.,,98 Ewald completed his entry by asserting again that "one had to
conclude" that the British hoped to end the war "without shedding the blood of the
99
King's subjects in a needless way."
Two days later the British army set out to follow Washington across the Delaware
River, a march that took two days. Ewald was again critical of British slowness:
On this two-day march, which could have been done in twelve hours by an
army that carried so little artillery, it became clearly evident that the march
took place so slowly for no other reason that to permit Washington to
cross the Delaware safely and peacefully. I was assured that Lord
Comwallis had orders from General Howe to proceed in such a way.-The
two Howe brothers belong to the Opposition Party.-Therefore no more
IOO
need be said. They will not and dare not act otherwise.

96

Joseph Galloway of Philadelphia, the most outspoken loyalist in America. He had been
a member of the Pennsylvania Assembly and the First Continental Congress, but was an
uncompromising Tory. Galloway had left his country home at Trevose and made his way
to the British army at New Brunswick in early December 1776. He criticized General
Howe unmercifully for his conduct of the New Jersey campaign and thought Howe had
deliberately allowed Washington to escape into Pennsylvania, as did Captain Ewald
(William H. Nelson, The American Tory [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961], 8-10,
47-48,50-69, 135-9).
97

Ewald, Diary ofthe American War, 25.
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Observations such as the above reveal much not only about the highly politicized nature
ofthe war, but also about the general problems with British strategy at the outset of the
war.
In England, the American Revolution was a powerful political issue. The
parliamentary minority was largely Whig and had supported many ofthe American
protests and arguments as opposition policy. 10 I To command the British army and navy
in America, the Ministry had appointed Major General William Howe and Vice Admiral
Richard Howe, two brothers who were actually Whigs. Yet the Ministry also named
them as peace commissioners to accept America's submission to British authority and
then to open negotiations on political refonns. Historians have contended that this dual
mission was probably an error on the part of the British Ministry. At the very least, this
dual responsibility of being both warriors and diplomats proved a distraction to the
Howes; at worst, it caused them to proceed more cautiously than they otherwise might
have done.

102

•

WhIchever was the case, Ewald was obviously aware of the fact that the

Howe brothers were of the opposition party in parliament, and believed this partisan
orientation to be the main reason for General Howe's failure to capture Washington in
1776.
Ewald again raised the issue of politics after the battle of Brandywine on 11
September 1777. As he recounted the details of the battle, the British envelopment of
Washington's right wing, with himselfleading the column, he recalled the slowness of
the march:
101

Peckham, The War for Independence, 39.
102When General Howe testified before a Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry in 1779,
he denied pennitting Washington to escape (Troyer S. Anderson, The Command ofthe
Howe Brothers During the American Revolution [New York and London: Oxford
University Press, 1936], 183-4, 204-6, 208-9; Ira D. Gruber, The Howe Brothers and the
American Revolution [New York: Athenum, 1972], 156-7, 350-65). Professor Ira D.
Gruber contends, though, that the Howe brothers' hopes of conciliation were primarily
responsible for British military failure in 1776 (Gruber, The Howe Brothers and the
American Revolution, 350-65).
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For my part, I conclude that the slow march of the left column took place
with all deliberation, so that the American army would not be destroyed to
pay a fresh compliment to the Opposition Parry, and to bring forth a new
proposal. My suspicions were strengthened anew when I observed the
army on the battlefield overnight - perfectly quiet, without a single man
sent after the enemy and without any outposts ....103
Clearly, Ewald believed that Howe did not want to destroy Washington's army for
political reasons.
In the next week Washington's army retreated to the Schuylkill River on the edge
of Philadelphia and prepared for an attack against the British army while the latter was
still on the march. Fortunately for the British, Washington's attack was drowned out in a
torrential rainstorm. Ewald was critical of British slowness, and once again attributed
their failure to catch up with Washington to General Howe:
I firmly believe that we still could have caught up with the greater part of
the enemy army, at least the baggage, somewhere near the right bank of
the Schuylkill River, if it had been the will of General Howe. But the
three-day delay on the battlefield after the battle convinced me that we
certainly would have halted even if no rain had fallen, because we surely
knew that we were hard on Washington's heels. 104
Ewald's criticism of British strategy continued throughout the duration of the army's first
several campaigns, recognizing that the army had "continually lost in the end what we
won with the first rush in the beginning."lOs
Captain Ewald was especially critical of Benedict Arnold, then a British brigadier
general, and clashed with him over the general's tactics. Shortly after the army's
disembarkation at the beginning of the Sixth Campaignl06, Arnold had ordered the Jagers
103

Ewald, Diary ofthe American War, 87 (11 September 1777).
104lbid ., 89 (17 September 1777).
105 .
IbId., 173 (31 July 1779).
106The Sixth Campaign, 1781, also known as the Yorktown Campaign, involved the
closing military operations of the war. After his unsuccessful Carolina campaign (1780
81), General Cornwallis retreated into Virginia, fortified Yorktown, and awaited
reinforcements from Sir Henry Clinton in New York. Clinton delayed, however, and the
French fleet under Adm. de Grasse blockaded Chesapeake Bay. Generals Washington
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and a contingent of sharpshooters (soldiers without bayonets) to land at Ewald's
discretion and attack a small body of Americans (equipped with bayonets), which had
appeared on the left bank of the James River at Warwick, Virginia. Such poor judgment
on the part of Arnold infuriated Captain Ewald, who did not deny "that this little trick left
me with no great opinion of General Arnold's judgment ... especially since the [British]
light infantry was as close to [the Americans] as I was.,,107 Ewald was also severely
critical of Arnold's character, and noted that "his dishonourable undertaking ...
nevertheless cannot be justified," which itself testifies to the exceedingly honorable
character of Captain Ewald. To him, Arnold's betrayal of his country was reprehensible:
Ifhe really felt in his conscience that he had done wrong in siding against
his mother country, he should have sheathed his sword and served no
more .... This would have gained more proselytes than his shameful
enterprise, which every man of honor and fine feelings - whether he be
friend or foe - must loathe.
Gladly as I would have paid with my blood and my life for England's
success in this war, this man remained so detestable to me that I had to use
I08
every effort not to let him perceive ... the indignation of my soul.
Certainly, Ewald found fault not only with General Arnold's military judgment but with
his ethical conduct as well.
Indeed, Captain Ewald's criticism of British strategy continued well into the
Virginia Campaign of 1781. Ewald illuminates the controversy surrounding Cornwallis's
impending march into Virginia in his diary entry of 12 April 1779, where he was
especially fearful of what might happen if Cornwallis left North Carolina to rendezvous
with Major General William Phillips and his force of 2,000 men in Virginia. Ewald
concluded:

and Rochambeau rushed south with French troops, while Steuben and Lafayette
maintained a holding action.
107 .
IbId., 259-60 (31 December 1780).
108
Ibid., 295-6 (31 March 1781).

31
If the junction between Cornwallis and Phillips takes place, all but a few
posts will soon fall into the enemy's hands again. I did not like the
proposed combination of the two corps as long as [General Nathanael]
Greene still had an army in Carolina, for it meant an acre ofland won here
and fifty lost there. But once again, it is the favorite plan of England to
•
•
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have somethmg m every comer and much nowhere.

In truth, Ewald's apprehension concerning Cornwallis's march was quite similar to that
felt by General Sir Henry Clinton, then Commander in Chief of the British forces, who
had not given Cornwallis permission to march into Virginia. On 25 April, without
waiting for orders from Clinton, Cornwallis started his long march northward across
North Carolina, thus exposing several of the British posts in South Carolina to great
danger.

11O

Cornwallis joined the army under Benedict Arnold (Phillips had just died) at

Petersburg, Virginia on 20 May 1781, where he also took command. Clinton, upon
learning of this, was astounded by Cornwallis's flagrant disregard for his original orders
to safeguard South Carolina (as now the British army had been forced into solid operation
in Virginia as well) and believed that the Southern campaign was therefore doomed.

111

Clearly, Ewald demonstrated sound knowledge of military tactics by observations such as
this, especially when his criticisms of General Cornwallis were the same as those felt by .
the Commanding General Sir Henry Clinton.
Ewald also recognized the bleakness of the situation for the British at Yorktown,
where in August 1781 Cornwallis's force of nearly 8,000 had taken up a defensive
posture against a numerically superior combined American and French force of almost
18,000 troops. As a British naval force sailed from New York City to reinforce
Cornwallis, the sinking spirits of the British soldiers were raised a bit. Ewald, however,
took a more realistic view of their predicament:

109Ibid .,

297 (12 April 1781).
110 Cornwallis's departure left a young nobleman of twenty-six, Lieutenant Colonel
Francis Lord Rawdon, in command of the small British field forces in South Carolina
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Without bragging about my limited perception, I have told everyone that
as soon as one of these redoubts is taken the business is at an end, and
Washington has us in his pocket. Yet one still hears, "But our fleet will
~
'
. the siege."112
come belore
th
at tIme
and raIse
Cornwallis, who by late September knew that he was in dire straits, shared Ewald's view.
On the night of 16 October two vital redoubts fell, and the next day Cornwallis asked for

terms of surrender. I 13 Two days later his troops, British, Loyalist, and German, marched
into captivity. Ewald again illuminated the highly politicized nature of the war after
Cornwallis's capture, noting that "[t]his disaster ... will give the Opposition Party in
England enough impetus to carry through its plan to give up the dominions in North
America."

114

And once more, Ewald offered up a critical assessment of British military

failure:
This is the result of the absurd rules established during a war in which no
plan was followed. The enemy was only pulled in all directions and
nowhere driven by force, whereby all was lost, when it was desired to
preserve all. It is terrible, when one considers that the finest and most
valiant army - after six campaigns - was brought completely back to the
point from which it started with the most auspicious prospects six years
ago. And this, indeed, against a people who were no soldiers, and who
IIS
could have been stamped to the ground in the first year.
Obviously, Ewald believed that British strategy had been faulty from the outset of the
war in America.
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Indeed, Ewald's critical opinions of the British generals and their conduct of the
war help us to gain a better understanding of the highly politicized nature of the military
contest and the problems of Britain's overall strategy, as the British army ''was put to
such poor use that eight campaigns were lost, followed by the loss of thirteen provinces,
which in a word, had torn down the Crown of England from its loftiest peak.,,116
Moreover, Ewald's opinions are of considerable value because of his position as one who
not only enjoyed professional relationships with the British commanders but who was
also always active in the field fighting beside his troops in every major battle of the war
plus a countless number of those smaller engagements which characterized, in the words
·
of Genera1 Wash mgton,
the "War 0 f Posts."117

The Continental Army
Equally important are Ewald's observations with respect to the Continental Army,
as we can observe the changing nature of this army over the course of the war as well as
the determined and resolute character of the Continental soldier.
Students of the Revolution can clearly observe the developing nature of the
Continental Army as revealed by Captain Ewald's field notes. As the situation stood in
1775, the American colonies lacked a standing army and were thus the militarily weaker
side. While the siege of Boston moved toward the fierce contest at Bunker Hill, the
Continental Congress voted to raise 15,000 troops as a Continental army and selected
Colonel George Washington of Virginia as commander in chief. I 18
Not only was the Continental Army a poor man's army, as there were outstanding
uniform and equipment deficiencies, but it was also largely untrained and far less
116
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disciplined than its European counterpart. Certainly, the Continentals "could not match
the well-drilled British [and Hessians] in the battlefield maneuverability and tactical
articulation of their battalions.,,119 Indeed, neither Washington nor his lieutenants were
soldiers "steeped in the literature ofwar.,,120
As the Ewald diary reveals, however, the American officers made strenuous
efforts to correct this lack of doctrinal knowledge on the part of their army. He recorded
in December 1777 how during the first two years of the war,
the Americans have trained a great many excellent officers who very often
shame and excel our experienced officers, who consider it sinful to read a
121
book or to think oflearning anything during the war.
On one occasion when Ewald examined a knapsack his lagers had taken off of a
Continental soldier, he discovered "the most excellent military books translated into their
language.,,122 Apparently this had been the case countless times before, as Ewald
recorded that he had found several of these books, including Tie1ke's Field Engineer and
"the Instructions of the great Frederick to his generals ... more than one hundred
times.,,123 "Moreover," he continued, "several of their officers had designed excellent
small handbooks and distributed them in the army.,,124 Obviously, continual discoveries
of this kind impressed Captain Ewald:
Upon finding these books, I have exhorted our gentlemen many times to
read and emulate these people, who only two years before were hunters,
lawyers, physicians, clergymen, tradesmen, innkeepers, shoemakers, and
125
tailors.
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Clearly, the American officers were quite conscious of what they did not know and
recognized the disadvantage at which this deficiency placed them. Thus they strove not
only to instruct themselves by reading military books but impressed this need to learn
upon their soldiers as well.
Also visible through Ewald's observations are the improvements made in the
training and drilling of the American army as a result of the efforts of Prussian
drillmaster Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, who arrived in America on 1
December 1777 as "the answer to the American training problem and a way in which the
American army could be made more effective.,,126 Upon examining Washington's
soldiers at Valley Forge in early 1778, Steuben instituted a training program (essentially
an adaptation of the Prussian drill system) which would give the army a unifonnity it had
never possessed. His work proved exceedingly valuable, as the American soldiers
learned close-quarter drill and ceremony, how to properly carry the musket, load it, and
127
fire it, how to fix the bayonet, and how to charge.
Ewald attested to the effectiveness
of Steuben's instruction:
The so-called Continental, or standing, regiments are under good
discipline and drill ... as well as the English themselves. I have seen the
Rhode Island regiment march and perfonn several mountings of the guard
which left nothing to criticize. The men were complete masters of their
legs, carried their weapons well, held their heads straight, faced right
without moving an eye, and wheeled so excellently without their officers
having to shout much, that the regiment looked like it was dressed with a
. 128
strIng.
The American Anny thus became more skillful under the instruction of Steuben, as
Captain Ewald could certainly affinn. Apparently the Continental Congress had taken
notice as well, as they had in May 1778 appointed Steuben inspector general of the anny
with the rank and pay of major general.
126
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Additionally, the Ewald diary reveals the detennined and resolute nature of the
Continental soldier as seen through the eyes of a foreign observer. While conducting
patrols in New Jersey in the late November 1776, Ewald and the Jagers skinnished with
American riflemen from the corps of Colonel Daniel Morgan. When the Jagers took a
prisoner, Ewald questioned the man to find out where the Americans were posted. "The
captured rifleman," Ewald recorded, "resolutely declared that he was my prisoner but not
my spy. I admired this worthy man.,,129 Certainly, Ewald did not share the "contempt of
the English" with regard to his enemy, but asserted that "one should not think that [the
American army] can be compared to a motley crowd of fanners" such as the militia. 130
Ewald attested to seeing many Continental soldiers "without shoes, with tattered breeches
and unifonns ... who marched and stood their guard as proudly as the best uniformed
soldier in the world. ,,131
Ewald's most illuminating observations concerning the determination of the
Continental army came shortly after Cornwallis's surrender:
With what soldiers in the world could one do what was done by these
men, who go about nearly naked and in the greatest privation? Deny the
best-disciplined soldiers of Europe what is due them and they will run
away in droves, and the general will soon be alone. But from this one can
perceive what an enthusiasm - which these poor fellows call "Liberty" 
can do!

132

Indeed, Ewald's assertion was sustained by that of Steuben, who upon his initial
inspection of Washington's army at Valley Forge had reported that no European army
would have held together under such deprivations of food, clothing, and shelter.
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recorded a very similar analysis of his former opponents upon a visit to the garrison at
West Point shortly before his return to Germany:
Although I shuddered at the distress of these men, it filled me with awe for
them, for I did not think there was an army in the world which could be
maintained as cheaply as the American army....-What army could be
maintained in this manner? None, certainly, for the whole army would
gradually run away.-This, too, is a part of the "Liberty and Independence"
for which these poor fellows had to have their arms and legs smashed.-But
to what cannot enthusiasm lead a people!134

Clearly, the Ewald diary reveals the fortitude of the American soldiers and their faithful
devotion to their cause. Through Ewald we see the resolute character of an army that
willingly endured the hardships of materiel deficiency in order to cast off the yoke of the
English government once and for all.

Conclusion
The diary of Captain Ewald, an experienced, professional soldier, is a most
important contribution to the understanding of the nature of the War of the Revolution. It
enables us to arrive at a more accurate estimation of the significant Hessian contribution
to the British war effort, particularly that of Captain Ewald and the Field Jager Corps, the
Hessian elite light infantry. The Ewald diary opens up the wider issues of Hessian
participation and our interpretation of the same, as we can clearly ascertain the usefulness
of Ewald and the Jager Corps and the importance and significance of their service to the
army of Sir William Howe and other British generals.
Even though the Jagers were only a small fraction (numbering slightly over 1,000
troops) of the total Hessian forces, the Ewald diary reveals that the Jagers did indeed
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perfonn significant duties disproportionate to their relative numbers. The Jagers were
extremely useful to the British anny, and were especially effective against American
riflemen and artillery positions during sieges. They often led the vanguard of British and
Hessian forces or flanked both sides of the column, and just as often fonned the rear
guard which covered a retreat or withdrawal. When the troops deployed in battle, the
Jagers usually fonned the flanks. Frequently operating as detachments, they were also
employed to great advantage in reconnoitering and patrol duties, and in protecting
foraging parties and headquarters. Clearly, the Jagers added far more to the British war
effort than numbers alone. Their active combat service was militarily significant, as they
enhanced the power and maneuverability of the British anny and thus strengthened
British capability to conduct the war. In light of this, the standing military histories of the
American Revolution are in need of a revision which will restore the importance of the
Hessian Jager Corps as a far more significant part of the total British fighting force that
attempted to subdue the American colonies. Thus, the effect of the Ewald diary is not

,

only to add depth to the existing body of knowledge concerning Hessian participation in
the American Revolution, but also to allow us to make a different judgment which will
correct the standing military histories of the conflict.
The Ewald diary is additionally important because it allows us to better
understand the nature of the American Revolution as a military contest. His diary reveals
not only the importance of the Hessian Jager Corps to the British anny, but also gives
students of the American Revolution a first-hand look at the partisan and irregular nature
of the war.

134Ewald, Diary of the American War, 355 (22 October 1783).
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Furthennore, Ewald is a unique observer and incredible commentator on the
Revolution, and is able to reveal things about the total conflict that have otherwise
received scant attention as well. Ewald's military judgments concerning British conduct
of the war reveal the highly politicized nature of the conflict and the overall problems
with British strategy. His observations concerning the American army reveal a
detennined body of soldiers who willingly endured continual hardship in order to cast off
the yoke of the English government.
Moreover, Ewald is exceedingly qualified to comment and his observations are of
far more value simply because of his position as an officer on the front lines who also
enjoyed not only the professional friendship but also the confidence of numerous highranking British officers. Perspectives such as this are scarce, which is the reason that the
Ewald diary is of such great value to students of the American Revolutiono In addition,
the fact that Ewald published his Treatise on Partisan Waifare (1785) upon returning to
Gennany reflects not only his real interest in military tactics but is greater proof of his
professionalism and gives him larger credence as a diarist.
Indeed, through the diary of Captain Ewald we can not only correct the standing
military histories of the Revolution to include the importance of the Hessian Jager Corps
as a far more significant part of the British war effort, but we can in essence understand
more distinctly the nature of the conflict which, in the words of Ewald, ultimately
resulted in the "utter loss of the thirteen splendid provinces of the Crown of England.,,135
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